

115TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3025

To strengthen security and deterrence in Europe and to hold the Russian Federation accountable for violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 22, 2017

Mr. SMITH of Washington (for himself, Ms. SPEIER, Mr. GARAMENDI, Ms. BORDALLO, Mr. COURTNEY, Mr. LANGEVIN, Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, Mrs. MURPHY of Florida, Mr. GALLEG0, Mrs. DAVIS of California, Mr. MOULTON, Mr. BROWN of Maryland, Mr. COOPER, Ms. SHEA-PORTER, Mr. NORCROSS, Mr. VEASEY, Ms. TSONGAS, Mr. MCEACHIN, Ms. ROSEN, Ms. HANABUSA, Mr. O'HALLERAN, and Mr. SUOZZI) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To strengthen security and deterrence in Europe and to hold the Russian Federation accountable for violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Fostering Unity
3 Against Russian Aggression Act of 2017”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

6 (1) General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Commander
7 of the United States European Command, testified
8 before the House Armed Services Committee on
9 March 27, 2017, that “Today we face the most dy-
10 namic European security environment in history.”
11 and that “Russia’s malign actions are supported by
12 its diplomatic, information, economic, and military
13 initiatives.”.

14 (2) The Russian Federation continues to be in
15 violation of INF Treaty as a result of testing and
16 deploying a new nuclear-capable cruise missile.

17 (3) The Russian Federation has shifted to a
18 military doctrine that envisions using nuclear weap-
19 ons in an attempt to end a failing regional conven-
20 tional conflict. On June 25, 2015, Deputy Secretary
21 of Defense Robert Work and then-Vice-Chairman of
22 the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James Winnefeld
23 testified before the House Armed Services Com-
24 mittee that “Russian military doctrine includes what
25 some have called an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ strat-
26 egy—a strategy that purportedly seeks to deescalate

1 a conventional conflict through coercive threats, in-
2 cluding limited nuclear use. We think that this label
3 is dangerously misleading. Anyone who thinks they
4 can control escalation through the use of nuclear
5 weapons is literally playing with fire. Escalation is
6 escalation, and nuclear use would be the ultimate es-
7 calation.”.

8 (4) General Scaparrotti noted in his March 27,
9 2017, testimony before the House Armed Services
10 Committee that “Moscow’s provocative rhetoric and
11 nuclear threats increase the likelihood of misunder-
12 standing and miscalculation.”.

13 (5) The Russian Federation continues to con-
14 duct ongoing influence campaigns aimed at under-
15 mining democracies around the world. According to
16 an assessment by the intelligence community, “Rus-
17 sian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence
18 campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential
19 election”, which included the use of the Russian
20 military intelligence organization. The intelligence
21 community also assessed that Russia would apply
22 lessons learned to future influence efforts worldwide,
23 including against United States allies and their elec-
24 tion systems.

1 (6) The Russian Federation continues its ag-
2 gression on its periphery. In 2008, the Russian Fed-
3 eration fomented conflict in Georgia. The Russian
4 Federation has also illegally occupied and attempted
5 to annex Crimea. Further, the Russian Federation is
6 directing combined Russian-Separatist units in east-
7 ern Ukraine, actively inciting violence and pro-
8 longing the most significant conflict in Europe.

9 (7) The investment of over \$5 billion in the Eu-
10 ropean Reassurance Initiative (ERI), now the Euro-
11 pean Deterrence Initiative (EDI), has proven suc-
12 cessful in significantly enhancing the ability of
13 United States forces, NATO allies, and regional
14 partners to deter Russian aggression. EDI has not
15 only assured our European allies and partners but
16 supported essential investments in NATO’s military
17 capacity, interoperability, and agility.

18 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that—

20 (1) the Russian Federation should return to
21 compliance with the INF Treaty in a verifiable man-
22 ner as soon as possible;

23 (2) the risks of miscalculation in a crisis are ex-
24 acerbated by the Russian Federation’s shift to a
25 military doctrine of “escalate to de-escalate”, low-

1 ering the threshold for Russian use of nuclear weap-
2 ons and thereby increasing the risk of using nuclear
3 weapons, potentially escalating in to a massive nu-
4 clear exchange;

5 (3) strengthening effective and credible conven-
6 tional deterrence, particularly on the northeastern
7 flank of NATO, is a political and military priority;

8 (4) NATO's formal adoption at the 2014 Wales
9 Summit of the goal for each member state to allo-
10 cate at least two percent of its gross domestic prod-
11 uct to its national defense budget within a decade
12 should be commended, as increased defense spending
13 by NATO member states is strongly encouraged to
14 maintain the alliance's strategic vitality through the
15 enhancement of its collective capacity;

16 (5) reaffirming support for the principle of col-
17 lective defense in Article 5 of the North Atlantic
18 Treaty for NATO allies is vital to a strong and
19 meaningful alliance and is not conditional;

20 (6) subversive and destabilizing activities by the
21 Russian Federation targeting NATO allies and part-
22 ners causes concern and should be condemned;

23 (7) strengthened deterrence efforts by NATO
24 allies, including NATO's Enhanced Forward Pres-
25 ence, should be commended and enhancing defense

1 cooperation efforts with NATO allies and partners
2 should be encouraged;

3 (8) European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) in-
4 vestments are long-term and, as such, Congress ex-
5 pects future budgets to reflect United States com-
6 mitment by planning for funding in the base budget,
7 and further EDI should build on United States pres-
8 ence by increasing the United States permanent
9 force posture; and

10 (9) credible deterrence requires steadfast co-
11 operation and joint action with NATO allies and
12 partners and other United States allies and partners
13 in Europe.

14 **SEC. 3. STRATEGY TO COUNTER THREATS BY THE RUSSIAN**
15 **FEDERATION.**

16 (a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of De-
17 fense, in consultation with each of the Secretaries of the
18 military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
19 commanders of each of the regional and functional com-
20 batant commands, shall develop and implement a com-
21 prehensive strategy to counter threats by the Russian Fed-
22 eration.

23 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—

24 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
25 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-

1 retary of Defense shall submit to the congressional
2 defense committees a report on the strategy required
3 by subsection (a).

4 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by this
5 subsection shall include the following elements:

6 (A) An evaluation of strategic objectives
7 and motivations of the Russian Federation.

8 (B) A detailed description of Russian
9 threats to the national security of the United
10 States, including threats that may pose chal-
11 lenges below the threshold of armed conflict.

12 (C) A discussion of how the strategy com-
13 plements the National Defense Strategy and
14 the National Military Strategy.

15 (D) A discussion of the ends, ways, and
16 means inherent to the strategy.

17 (E) A discussion of the strategy's objec-
18 tives with respect to deterrence, escalation con-
19 trol, and conflict resolution.

20 (F) A description of the military activities
21 across geographic regions and military func-
22 tions and domains that are inherent to the
23 strategy.

1 (G) A description of the posture, forward
2 presence, and readiness requirements inherent
3 to the strategy.

4 (H) A description of the roles of the
5 United States Armed Forces in implementing
6 the strategy, including—

7 (i) the role of United States nuclear
8 capabilities;

9 (ii) the role of United States space ca-
10 pabilities;

11 (iii) the role of United States cyber
12 capabilities;

13 (iv) the role of United States conven-
14 tional ground forces;

15 (v) the role of United States naval
16 forces;

17 (vi) the role of United States air
18 forces; and

19 (vii) the role of United States special
20 operations forces.

21 (I) An assessment of contributions of
22 United States allies and partners in countering
23 Russian threats and a description of the roles
24 of allies and partners in implementing and sus-
25 taining the strategy.

1 (J) An assessment of the force require-
2 ments needed to implement and sustain the
3 strategy.

4 (K) A description of the logistical require-
5 ments needed to implement and sustain the
6 strategy.

7 (L) An assessment of the technological re-
8 search and development requirements needed to
9 implement and sustain the strategy.

10 (M) An assessment of the training and ex-
11 ercise requirements needed to implement and
12 sustain the strategy.

13 (N) An assessment of the budgetary re-
14 source requirements needed to implement and
15 sustain the strategy through December 31,
16 2030.

17 (O) A discussion of how the strategy pro-
18 vides a framework for future planning and in-
19 vestments in regional defense initiatives, includ-
20 ing the European Deterrence Initiative.

21 (3) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
22 section shall be submitted in unclassified form but
23 may contain a classified annex.

1 **SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO INCREASE CONVENTIONAL PRECI-**
2 **SION STRIKE WEAPON STOCKPILES IN THE**
3 **UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND'S**
4 **AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.**

5 (a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense
7 shall develop and implement a strategy to increase
8 conventional precision strike weapon stockpiles in
9 the United States European Command's areas of re-
10 sponsibility.

11 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by this
12 subsection shall include necessary increases in the
13 quantities of such stockpiles that the Secretary de-
14 termines will enhance deterrence and warfighting ca-
15 pability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
16 forces.

17 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 1,
19 2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
20 congressional defense committees a report on the
21 strategy required by subsection (a).

22 (2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
23 section shall be submitted in unclassified form but
24 may contain a classified annex.

1 **SEC. 5. PLAN TO COUNTER THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES**
2 **OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

3 (a) PLAN REQUIRED.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense
5 shall develop and implement a plan to counter the
6 military capabilities of the Russian Federation.

7 (2) ELEMENTS.—The plan required by this
8 subsection shall include the following:

9 (A) Accelerating programs to improve the
10 capability of United States military forces to
11 operate in a Global Positioning System (GPS)-
12 denied or GPS-degraded environment.

13 (B) Accelerating programs of the Depart-
14 ment of the Army to counter Russian un-
15 manned aircraft systems, electronic warfare,
16 and long-range precision strike capabilities.

17 (C) Countering unconventional capabilities
18 and hybrid threats from the Russian Federa-
19 tion.

20 (D) Any other elements that the Secretary
21 determines to be appropriate.

22 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 1,
24 2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
25 congressional defense committees a report on the
26 plan required by subsection (a).

1 (2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
2 section shall be submitted in unclassified form but
3 may contain a classified annex.

4 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that—

6 (1) the strategy for the Department of Defense
7 to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by
8 adversarial state and non-state actors required by
9 section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization
10 Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92) has
11 not yet been submitted to the congressional defense
12 committees and should be submitted without further
13 delay; and

14 (2) concerns persist over the growing sophis-
15 tication of unconventional and hybrid state-spon-
16 sored threats by the Russian Federation as dem-
17 onstrated through its advancement and integration
18 of conventional warfare, economic warfare, cyber
19 and information operations, intelligence operations,
20 and other activities to undermine United States na-
21 tional security objectives as well as the objectives of
22 United States allies and partners in Europe.

1 **SEC. 6. PLAN TO PROVIDE TRAINING TO THE NATIONAL SE-**
2 **CURITY FORCES OF UNITED STATES ALLIES**
3 **AND PARTNERS TO COUNTER CYBERSPACE**
4 **OPERATIONS AND INFORMATION OPER-**
5 **ATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

6 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
7 gress that—

8 (1) the establishment by the Commander of the
9 United States European Command of the inter-
10 agency Russian Information Group to counter Rus-
11 sian information operations against the United
12 States and United States allies and partners should
13 be supported and cooperation and synchronization of
14 efforts and activities with the Department of State’s
15 Global Engagement Center and with the NATO
16 Strategic Communications Center of Excellence
17 should be encouraged;

18 (2) the Secretary of Defense should, to the ex-
19 tent appropriate, prioritize the transfer of funds as
20 authorized under section 1287(e) of the National
21 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
22 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2546) to the De-
23 partment of State’s Global Engagement Center spe-
24 cifically for the purpose of countering Russia state-
25 sponsored propaganda aimed at undermining the na-

1 tional security interests of the United States and
2 United States allies and partners; and

3 (3) the Secretary of Defense should prioritize
4 providing funding to the NATO Cooperative Cyber
5 Defense Center of Excellence and the NATO Stra-
6 tegic Communication Center of Excellence or pur-
7 poses of enhancing cooperation with NATO allies to
8 counter cyberspace operations of the Russian Fed-
9 eration against the national security interests of the
10 United States and United States and allies and
11 partners.

12 (b) PLAN REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense
13 shall develop and implement a plan to provide training to
14 the national security forces of United States allies and
15 partners for the purpose of building the capacity of such
16 forces to counter cyberspace operations and information
17 operations of the Russian Federation.

18 (c) REPORT REQUIRED.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 1,
20 2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
21 congressional defense committees a report on the
22 plan required by subsection (b).

23 (2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
24 section shall be submitted in unclassified form but
25 may contain a classified annex.

1 **SEC. 7. REPORT ON MAINTAINING AND EXPANDING FOR-**
2 **WARD PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES MILI-**
3 **TARY FORCES AND PERSONNEL IN EUROPE.**

4 (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than April 1,
5 2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the con-
6 gressional defense committees a report on the strategy of
7 the Department of Defense maintaining and expanding
8 forward presence of United States military forces and per-
9 sonnel in Europe.

10 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection
11 (a) shall include the following with respect to United
12 States European Command areas of responsibility:

13 (1) An assessment of the additional perma-
14 nently stationed forces in Europe required to meet
15 United States strategic requirements and the oper-
16 ational requirements of the geographic combatant
17 commander.

18 (2) An assessment of the infrastructure capac-
19 ity of existing European locations and their ability
20 to accommodate additional forces.

21 (3) An overview of new locations in Europe that
22 might be considered for permanently stationed forces
23 and the estimated cost and scope of infrastructure
24 investments, to include improvements to training
25 areas, which would be required at those locations to
26 support permanently stationed forces, including an

1 assessment of what infrastructure investments might
2 be provided by the host-nation as well as new con-
3 struction or modernization of existing facilities that
4 would be funded by the United States.

5 (4) A detailed list of investments in equipment,
6 supplies, logistics, storage, and maintenance, at cur-
7 rent and new locations in Europe, required to sup-
8 port additional permanently stationed forces.

9 (5) An assessment of the readiness advantages
10 and disadvantages associated with stationing addi-
11 tional permanent forces at European locations.

12 (6) A discussion of potential challenges with
13 stationing additional permanent forces or developing
14 new locations for permanently stationed forces as a
15 result of treaty obligations, international agree-
16 ments, or other legally binding instruments.

17 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
18 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include
19 a classified annex.

20 **SEC. 8. REPORT ON IMPROVING TRAINING AREAS IN THE**
21 **UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND'S**
22 **AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.**

23 (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than April 1,
24 2018, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
25 Secretaries of the military departments, the Commander

1 of the United States European Command, and the Com-
2 mander of the United States Special Operations Com-
3 mand, shall submit to the congressional defense commit-
4 tees a report on the location, capabilities, and capacities
5 of training areas in the United States European Com-
6 mand's areas of responsibility, including air and ground
7 ranges, range complexes, military training routes, and spe-
8 cial-use areas.

9 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection
10 (a) shall include the following:

11 (1) An inventory of such training areas that are
12 utilized by United States Armed Forces or with re-
13 spect to which United States Armed Forces have ac-
14 cess.

15 (2) An overview of the capabilities and capacity
16 of such training areas to support permanent and ro-
17 tational forward presence of United States Armed
18 Forces.

19 (3) An assessment of any capability gaps of
20 such training areas that limit the ability to meet
21 training standards of United States Armed Forces.

22 (4) Details of current and planned investments
23 in training infrastructure to mitigate identified capa-
24 bility gaps, help meet United States training stand-
25 ards, and support additional permanent or rotational

1 forces in Europe, to be funded by the NATO, the
2 United States, or United States allies or partners.

3 **SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING MARITIME**
4 **CAPABILITIES.**

5 Congress notes the 2016 Force Structure Assessment
6 (FSA) that increased the requirement for fast attack sub-
7 marine (SSN) from 48 to 66 and supports an acquisition
8 plan that enhances maritime capabilities that address this
9 requirement.

10 **SEC. 10. PLAN TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF MISCALCULATION**
11 **AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES THAT**
12 **COULD PRECIPITATE A NUCLEAR WAR.**

13 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—

14 (1) the Russian Federation has adopted a dan-
15 gerous nuclear doctrine that includes a strategy of
16 “escalate to de-escalate”, which could lower the
17 threshold for Russian use of nuclear weapons in a
18 regional conflict; and

19 (2) such nuclear doctrine exacerbates the risks
20 of miscalculation and unintended consequences that
21 could precipitate a nuclear war.

22 (b) PLAN REQUIRED.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1,
24 2018, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with
25 the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, the Com-

1 mander of the United States Strategic Command,
 2 and the Commander of the United States European
 3 Command, shall submit to the congressional defense
 4 committees a plan that includes options to reduce
 5 the risk of miscalculation and unintended con-
 6 sequences that could precipitate a nuclear war.

7 (2) ELEMENTS.—The plan required under this
 8 subsection shall include—

9 (A) an assessment of the value of military-
 10 to-military dialog to reduce such risk; and

11 (B) any other recommendations the Sec-
 12 retary determines to be appropriate.

13 **SEC. 11. PLAN TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
 14 **THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION BY REASON OF**
 15 **NON-COMPLIANCE BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERA-**
 16 **TION WITH THE INF TREATY.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 1, 2018, the
 18 President shall submit to the congressional defense com-
 19 mittees a plan to impose sanctions with respect to the
 20 Russia Federation by reason of non-compliance by the
 21 Russian Federation with the INF Treaty.

22 (b) ELEMENTS.—The plan required under subsection
 23 (a) should include expanding asset freezes and travel bans,
 24 prohibiting financial transactions, prohibiting government-

1 to-government contracts, and any other sanctions that the
2 President determines to be appropriate.

3 (c) TERMINATION.—The plan required under sub-
4 section (a) shall provide for termination of sanctions de-
5 scribed in the plan beginning on the date on which the
6 President submits to the appropriate congressional com-
7 mittees a certification that the Russian Federation has
8 verifiably returned to compliance with the INF Treaty.

9 (d) COOPERATION.—The Secretary of State shall
10 seek to cooperate with United States allies and partners
11 to maximize the effect of sanctions described in the plan
12 required under subsection (a).

13 **SEC. 12. DEFINITIONS.**

14 In this Act:

15 (1) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES.—
16 The term “congressional defense committees” has
17 the meaning given such term in section 101 of title
18 10, United States Code.

19 (2) INF TREATY.—The term “INF Treaty”
20 means the Treaty Between the United States of
21 America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
22 on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and
23 Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the
24 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,

1 signed at Washington, December 8, 1987, and en-
2 tered into force June 1, 1988.

3 (3) NATO.—The term “NATO” means the
4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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